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ABSTRACT. Eskimo  wife  trading  has  often  been  reported and commented on  but has 
seldom been analysed from the standpoint of structural contexts or social function. 
Data from arctic Alaska  indicate that, for that area at least, the institution  was  more 
complex than had been supposed. Rather elaborate rules determined who could or 
could not exchange  wives, and doing so validated  a  formal  contract  which  restructured 
society to the advantage of the families  of all four participants.  Eskimo  society is almost 
unique in  that contracts  validated  in this manner  did not contradict  other  social insti- 
tutions. 
RI%UMfi. Fonctions et  limites  de l'kchange  des  épouses chez les Esquimaux. On a souvent 
signalé et commenté  l'échange  des  épouses  chez  les  Esquimaux,  mais on l'a peu  souvent 
analysé du point de vue  de  ses  contextes  structurels ou de sa fonction  sociale. En Alaska 
arctique, les données  indiquent  que, du moins dans cette  région, l'institution était plus 
complexe qu'on ne l'avait supposé. Des règles assez compliquées déterminaient qui 
pouvait ou ne  pouvait  pas  échanger son épouse et qui, par le fait même,  devenait  partie 
à un  contrat en  règle  restructurant la société à l'avantage  des  familles  des quatre parti- 
cipants.  La  société  esquimaude st unique  en  ce que  de tels contrats ne  contredisent  pas 
ses  autres  institutions  sociales. 
At least two excellent library surveys have been published on the subject of 
Eskimo wife trading (Guemple 1961, Rube1 1961). Both reports reach similar 
conclusions: although wife trading has been reported many  times, little is 
known about  it other than  that  it did take place.  Spencer  (1968) has since  reduced 
this deficiency  by publication of his article, "Spouse  Exchange Among the 
North Alaskan Eskimo.'' 
This scarcity of supporting details has not kept the example of Eskimo wife 
trading  from being  used as basic data  for theories and  as textbook examples of 
human adaptive processes. Scholarly explanations of the practice, although often 
only implicit, seem to fall into  two  broad categories which might be  called the 
economic expediency theory and  the lost paradise theory. 
The first, an anthropological approach, goes something like this: why is a 
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practice, absent elsewhere for  the  obvious  reason  that  it would  be disruptive in 
any other society, not disruptive for the Eskimo? The usual answer is that 
Eskimos have adapted to a peculiarly harsh  environment  and, in doing so, have 
made drastic compromises in their social order. A hunter needs a woman to 
chew his boots, the argument goes, but if his wife is incapacitated when the 
caribou  are running, he  is faced with a desperate problem: he can neither hunt 
nor leave off hunting. The  problem is  solved  by the hunter’s borrowing  someone 
else’s  wife, leaving  his  own in the other person’s care. No one is  offended  because 
everyone  recognizes the necessity  of the  act  and  knows  that  the other husband 
might have to use the  same expedient in the future. Thus life  is maintained in the 
Arctic. (For illustrative examples see Farb 1968, p. 68, Hoebel 1966, p. 364.) 
An implication of this first approach is that social control is a luxury of more 
prosperous societies. It would seem that if Eskimo economy became more 
secure, then wife trading would no longer be  necessary, would  arouse jealousy 
and social sanctions and guilt inculcation would be applied against it. 
The second  (“lost paradise”) approach takes the opposite view that social or 
psychological constraint is  oppressive, stultifying and unnecessary. According to 
this reasoning  freedom retreats as civilization advances. The individual can never 
realize his potential until he has shaken off the constraints of society. This 
argument seems to be  used more by novelists  such as Heinlein (1968, p. 348) and 
social critics than by anthropologists, but any anthropologist in the room is 
likely to be caught  short of basic data. 
Material which I gathered in 1961, 1962 and 1967 shows that, for Northern 
Alaska at least, neither theory holds water. In this  area legitimate wife trading 
was a strategy for building social ties, not  a hunting technique, and was  much 
too hemmed in with rules and constraints to satisfy the lost paradise theory. The 
practice of Eskimo wife trading will be reexamined here in the light of this 
information, from the viewpoint of balance between cost and benefit to the 
society. The questions are: how did the system work; how did it contribute  to  the 
maintenance of the larger society; and what structural limitations explain its 
absence  elsewhere? It should be noted that  the ethnographic present in this case 
ends  during the 189O’s, when missionaries put an end to  the practice. 
In trying to understand why Alaskan  Eskimos  traded wives and with  whom, 
it helps to keep  two  points  in  mind:  a stranger was  seen as  an enemy to be  killed 
on sight on the assumption that  the other fellow had  the  same idea, and one  could 
not  trade wives with close relatives. Informants  are consistent on these points. 
When two hunters met on the  tundra  the first impulse was to kill or  run. Any 
number of case histories contain this theme. The concept of stranger to the 
Eskimo included not only persons whose faces could not be recognized but 
anyone who could not be  placed in some positive relation to Ego, the  two being 
the  same in most cases. 
Stories told in the kardigi (ceremonial house) run something like this: a  hunter 
comes upon a stranger on  the  tundra, kills  him and hides the  body, usually by 
stuffing its guts with stones and sinking it  in  a river. The killer is not  at all sure 
the events went unwitnessed, perhaps by a  younger  brother of the slain man  who 
had been left in hiding. Even  if the killer  were not known,  trouble  might arise. 
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Whenever a  hunter failed to return  it was assumed that he had been killed, and 
suspicions developed about who was responsible. Suspicions and resentments 
were passed on  from  generation to generation, so that only an individual with 
whom one had positive structural  relations  could be trusted. 
The individual tried to protect himself by building a network of helpful 
relationships,  thereby  reducing  the  number of “strangers” in his  environment by 
making friends. Often the relationship was described in kinship terms. Given 
the bilateral Eskimo kinship system, almost anybody could be counted as a 
relative but,  outside  a  core of close kinsmen, recognition of consanguineal  bonds 
depended  on  mutual  acting  out of kinship  patterns  (Heinrich 1960, pp. 110-1  11). 
If a visitor to  a strange village heard  his akanakaan (roughly,  cousin)  address 
someone else as “akanakaan,” he immediately rushed to his new kinsman and 
tried  to  establish himself as  a relative. An example of the  potentiality and in- 
stability of the  kinship system is  found  in  the following folk  history.  Warriors 
from  Barrow  had lined up  for  a  battle  against Wainwright. Suddenly a  Barrow 
man began running back and  forth between the lines, shouting that he didn’t 
know which side to  join because he  had so many relatives in  both  groups.  Soon 
warriors who had  talked  against  the fight began remembering kinsmen on  the 
other side, and  the  battle was called off. Informants agreed that the  champion 
had  not really been in a quandary but had used kinship as a diplomatic ploy 
to make  both sides feel uneasy. 
A  further  disadvantage of the  kinship system was that in case of trouble one’s 
distant relatives were likely to side with their own close kinsmen and so be of 
little help, This gap was bridged by a series of achieved relationships. These 
non-kin  bonds  included  trading  partners (neivik), namesakes (atik), amulet 
partners (kopnegiit), people who were kinsmen in  the  other world before  birth 
and, of interest here, wife trading  partners.  The  advantage of having such ties 
was that the  other fellow could be expected to  stand  up  against his own kinsmen 
in defence of his partner. Cases are remembered where wars were avoided 
because someone tipped off his partner on the other side that an attack was 
planned. 
The second point in understanding  the  practice of  wife trading was that  North 
Alaskan  Eskimos recognized a  taboo which can be generalized as, “I may not 
have sexual  relations with anyone who has  had sexual relations with one of my 
close relatives.” This  levirate and  sororate  taboo  also  included  parents,  parents’ 
siblings, parents’ siblings’ children and siblings’ children,  after which “may  not” 
shaded off into degrees  of “should  not,”  until  no  kinship  bonds were recognized 
(Spencer 1959, p. 75). Violations of this  rule have been known to lead to suicide 
or  patricide. Wife trading  partners  (and  also  marriage  partners)  then were chosen 
from socially distant  and  potentially  dangerous families. 
These two  considerations, it should be noted,  had  the  same consequence, the 
scattering of social ties among  a  large  number of alien  groups. 
The system seems casual to  an outsider at first. An acquaintance  dropped in 
for a visit, there was a period of ordinary conversation, then the guest said, 
“I think  your wife  is rather  pretty.”  The  host  had  the  option of replying either, 
“I think  your wife is pretty  also,” or “I agree, my wife is pretty.” In  the first 
ALASKAN ESKIMO WIFE TRADING 27 
case a trading  agreement  had been reached; in  the  second the visitor had been 
politely refused. The response of the wife is not known  for sure. Informants say 
that she would  have  nothing to  do with the other fellow at first, “but she  always 
gave in  at last.” Ceremonial reluctance was common however for  true marriages 
also, and  it is not clear how  much  of this feminine hesitancy was spontaneous 
and how much was custom. 
The exchange was without  ceremony  but was not secret. Several informants 
remember coming home from watching a messenger feast dance to find their 
mothers copulating with a strange man (exchanges  were  always uxorilocal). 
The system did have a formal structure however,  well noticed by the  Eskimos 
themselves. Partners of the same sex addressed  each other as Aipak or Aipagiik 
(another me);  the  same  terms were  used  between co-husbands  in polygyny and 
co-wives in polyandry. If the partnership was terminated, members of the  same 
sex addressed each other as Anatuakaan. Informants say the first term means 
“copulating  with  the  same individual” while the  second means “divorced.” Case 
histories indicate that  the first term referred to a condition of mutual  trust  and 
helpfulness, based on  the socially  recognized criterion of having  copulated  with 
the same individual, while the  second stated that  this  trust  had been terminated. 
Informants, discussing their own relatives, might say, “he married this other 
man’s divorced wife so he had a right to call him Aipak.” Children  born  after 
a wife trading encounter referred to their parents’ partners as Aaparuk and 
Aanaruk (little father and little mother respectively) and were called Inikrunja 
and Puninrunja (resembles son and resembles daughter). Wife trading partners 
of the opposite sex referred to each  other  as Nuleronga (copulates). 
An offspring of one family, conceived after consummation of wife trading, 
addressed an offspring of the other family conceived after that date as katuk 
or katagiik. This  term  has  two definitions, either “half sibling” or “one of two 
otherwise unrelated individuals conceived after intercourse between one or both 
of their parents.” If an individual addressed another as katuk, he indicated 
either, “We are biologically related through  one  parent only,” or  “at least one of 
my parents  had sexual relations with at least one of your parents before either of 
us was conceived.” It may be obvious that no biological relationship existed 
between katuks, but kinship implications set the rule of conduct in every case. 
To the  Eskimo a katuk was a half sibling and must be treated as such. Katuks 
could result from divorce, widowhood, adultery or even rape, but wife trading 
gave  some regularity to  the system. 
The  above  words  are  terms of address, although they could also be used as 
descriptive terms or labels. (For additional vocabulary, see Gubser 1965, p. 68). 
This elaboration of the system and public testimony of social relationship, 
through  terms of address, were consistent with the  part wife trading  played in 
the maintenance of  society. 
North Alaskan Eskimos recognized three general situations in which wife 
trading was legitimate: settling marital disputes, reinforcing the status of im- 
portant people, and producing  kinsmen for one’s children. 
The first, or dispute settling strategy, was seldom used in practice. Many 
cases of disputes over women are available, but informants remember only a 
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few instances of these quarrels being resolved by wife trading. A woman in 
Wainwright committed adultery;  after her husband died the  facts became known. 
The lady’s second husband  approached  the  adulterer with the  proposition that 
since the  situation  had already started it might as well continue. The two became 
wife trading partners and addressed each other as Aipak even years after the 
coming of Christianity put  an end to their exchanges. 
A  hunter near Kotzebue drifted out on the ice and was presumed dead. The 
supposed widow remarried;  then  the first husband  returned, addressed the second 
as Aipak, thanked him for taking  care of his wife  while  he was gone and  took 
her back. No trouble arose. Here, presumably, defining the situation as wife 
trading  rather than remarriage gave the second husband  a face saving excuse for 
letting his wife be taken away. 
A woman of Barrow committed adultery; her husband learned what was 
going on and seduced the  other man’s wife in revenge. Later the offended husband 
publicly addressed the  other man as Aipak, thereby achieving three goals: he let 
the  other  man know that he knew what was going on, that the score had already 
been evened, and he gave the  adulterer an honourable excuse for  not  starting  a 
fight. The  adulterer hesitated a long moment, according to the  story  looked very 
uncomfortable, then replied with the honorific term Aipak. The matter ended 
there. This last case  is rather  pat  and may be stylized advice rather  than  a his- 
torical event. 
One reason why such cases are  hard  to come by may be that adultery was 
rather rare. Another  factor is that wife trading under these circumstances was 
safest for  mature  adults with established reputations, while disputes over women 
were often problems of the young. 
A second, and much more likely, situation was wife trading between important 
persons and those they sponsored. Skill in hunting  and good character merely 
qualified an individual for social advancement. To become an umailik (rich man) 
or kowklik (chief) one had to be patronized by someone already in  that position. 
The  last messenger feast in Barrow suggests how the system worked. For years 
Kapoon, a remarkably good hunter, had given meat and political support to 
Sovalik, a recognized kowklik. Kanipak was also on excellent terms with the 
old man. After many years the two helpers were trained in the complex task of 
organizing a messenger feast and  appointed second and  third kowklik respectively. 
Since the  sponsor was old, it was assumed that he would soon die and  the  other 
two would literally move up  a notch, since the record was kept on a notched 
“messenger stick.” 
Sponsor  and sponsored cemented their relationship in one of two ways: the 
older man could give his daughter in marriage to his helper or the two might 
exchange wives. The rationalization here was that the two people liked each 
other very much and so wanted to  do everything they could for each other,  and 
wife trading under these circumstances brought good luck. For example, in 
Barrow a whale captain  and his harpooner decided to exchange wives just before 
the whaling season. When the captain’s wife protested vigorously, she was told 
that if she didn’t cooperate they would not get any whales that year. When 
they didn’t get any whales anyway she was furious. This case is remembered for 
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the wife’s antics, not  for  the logic of the  situation which  was  seen as too reason- 
able to be entertaining. 
Analysis of case histories of trouble situations brings out a much  more  fun- 
damental consequence of wife trading under these circumstances. Duels, ven- 
dettas and other forms of local violence were much feared, and important 
people were especially in danger because they aroused envy. In remembered 
cases,  when a rich man was killed, it was  his  wife trading  partner,  not his kinsmen, 
who tried to avenge  him. In principle this resulted in a neat balance of power. 
If a rich man killed a  poor  man, he created a revenge  cycle with  one family. If 
a  poor man killed a rich man and then killed his wife trading partner in self 
defence,  he created a revenge  cycle  with two families. If there was more  than  one 
wife trading partner the poor man’s position could become hopeless. On the 
other hand, if a rich man involved his partners in too many disputes he was 
likely to lose help when  he  needed it most. 
For example,  a rich Wainwright  man stole a  poor man’s  only dog. The poor 
man  brooded over this insult for several days, then challenged the rich man to a 
duel. They  fought in full public view until the rich man was killed. The poor 
man  then challenged the  crowd,  demanding to know if anybody  wanted to  do 
anything about it. The rich  man’s  wife trading  partner said that if  he  didn’t have 
a  hurt knee  he  would  fight  his partner’s killer right away. The affair then ended. 
At the end of the story the informant and several others present commented 
that it was lucky  the  partner  had  a  good excuse for  not fighting because it would 
be a  shame to have to avenge such a mean rich man. 
This case  may  be an  aphorism,  but  the  point is that informants sensed that  the 
story was not complete until the  matter of the wife trading  partner was settled. 
Wife trading then can be seen as preserving law and order and supporting 
proper leadership. 
The  third  and,  from  the Eskimo’s point of view, by far  the most important 
motive  for wife trading was to create kinsmen  in  distant villages for one’s children. 
Children born after spouse exchange were katuks or half siblings and must 
protect each other from enemies. As one  informant  put  it:  “Now in the old days 
they were always happy to make their children some katuks, which means 
brothers and sisters. Now, for example, if you go to another place and your 
father  has been trading wives  with this guy,  his children are  your katuks, your 
brothers  and sisters. Maybe some  guy  will try  to kill you  and  you  have katuks 
there; this katuk can  try  to help you, your  brother or sister. That’s why in the 
old days they were  always happy to make katuks for their children.’’ 
A few examples will  suggest  how  much emphasis  Eskimos themselves  placed 
on this particular relationship. 
A hunter from Barrow came upon a lone individual on the tundra. Both 
parties set their arrows and circled toward  each other. When they got close, the 
Barrow man demanded, “What is squirrel?’’ and was told “Sigrigak.” The 
Barrow  man  asked  for several other words  until he  recognized the other man’s 
accent as  that of Wainwright. After more questions the confronters learned that 
their parents had  traded spouses. Weapons were immediately  dropped and  the 
two hunters embraced  each other. 
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A man  from  Utukok,  hunting alone on the  tundra, spotted a  group lying in 
wait for him in  a culvert. One of the enemy jumped  out  and challenged him to 
a duel. After some serious fighting the  Utukok  man  cut  the other’s bowstring 
and drove  him  back into  the culvert. Another enemy jumped  out to challenge 
the stranger and so on until five  of the larger party had been bested. The  Utukok 
man was then able to make an unchallenged retreat. More than  a year later  the 
hunter learned that one of  his katuks had been in  the enemy party  and  had risked 
his  life for his  half sibling. The katuk, being  hopelessly outnumbered, settled on 
a  compromise: if this party challenged his brother  one  at  a time, he wouldn’t 
fight them; if they ganged up, they would have two enemies on their hands. 
A man  from  Cape Lisburne, just  north of Point  Hope,  found  a foreigner who 
had drifted in on the ice. He recognized the other man as “a katuk by accident 
at Sheshalic,” that is, his mother had committed adultery during the annual 
trade fair at Sheshalic, just  north of Kotzebue.  The  lost  hunter, who  had drifted 
in from  Cape  Espenberg on the Seward Peninsula, was in terrible shape. He was 
given meat and water but was not  brought in until dark.  The  Point  Hope  man 
kept his katuk hidden until just before the  whaling season, then  sneaked  him into 
town under  a pile of skins. At  dawn the stranger was found waiting in  the kardigi 
(ceremonial house). One loud fellow declared, “I suspected all along that you 
were hiding a  man  in  your house.” The Point Hope  man replied, “I kept him all 
winter because  he  is my katuk.” The others said that  in  that case they would not 
kill him and were told that, “If you  had I would  have lain down beside him” 
(e.g., would have committed suicide). The stranger remained in Point Hope 
during  the  whaling  season and was returned to his  own people  during  the next 
trade  fair  at Sheshalic. 
One  more example of danger for  contrast: three hunters, starving and nearly 
dead, drifted in on the ice near  Point  Hope.  The men  of Point Hope recognized 
the hunters by their accents as being from well to  the  south. They cut  the strangers’ 
throats  and left their bodies on the ice. 
There were also circumstances in which one  could  not  trade wives. As already 
mentioned, close  relatives could not  share  the  same individual sexually. If 
brothers could exchange wives the function of scattering social ties would be 
lost  and,  in addition, the resulting chaos in the kinship system might be more 
than  the structure would bear. 
Another rule was that wife trading  should  not have the appearance of self- 
indulgence or exploitation. For example, young people should not exchange 
spouses within the  community on their own initiative. Informants were emphatic 
in condemning young people who “sneaked around.” Transgressors were in a 
difficult position; if they tried to keep their affairs secret they were accused of 
dishonesty; if they addressed  each  other as Aipak they were open to ridicule for 
“acting just like rich people.” It is easy to see that if anyone could exchange 
wives the function of protecting important  people  would be lost. 
Wives could not be exchanged between recognized enemies. Warfare was 
common and women were sometimes captured but, if raped, they were killed 
soon after to prevent the creation of half sibling relations. Several cases were 
remembered where females were held prisoner for a time without being used 
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sexually. Again, the system probably would not work if kinship obligations 
directly contradicted revenge obligations. 
The rules then were that a man should have wife trading partners in every 
community he regularly visited or expected his children to visit. He might also 
exchange wives with important people in his own community if he were  willing 
to pay the price in revenge obligations. And, once he  had established his position 
in the community, he might use wife trading to settle marital disputes. 
Other  acts of  infidelity  were strongly discouraged. In one case a  Point  Hope 
man returned  from  a long hunting  trip to discover that his wife had been having 
regular sexual relations with his wife trading partner without his permission. 
The offended husband “stomped” his  wife to death  and  later began to go crazy, 
until at last he was executed. Informants said that although  the wife’s unfaith- 
fulness was not necessarily causal, it was at least symptomatic of the hunter’s 
decline. 
One informant married a white man at Point Hope, became pregnant and was 
abandoned on the Seward Peninsula several hundred miles from her home. 
During her desperate journey back the informant took a protector and lover. 
Her  mother discovered what was going on through  shaman power and forced 
her daughter to give up this illicit affair, which might seem reasonable to us. 
Three functions have been mentioned for wife trading; any number more 
might be added,  but  one  important consequence might come as  a surprise. The 
practice served to reinforce tight  standards of sexual morality. It was unthinkable 
that a  parent might not  inform his own children who their half siblings were; to 
fail to  do so might result in ingroup homicide or incest. Consequently, sexual 
transgressions could not be kept secret. Stories are  told of more  than  one  mature 
lady who gathered her children about her to describe her own acts of unfaith- 
fulness and to lecture them  on their consequent obligations to katuks they never 
knew they had. 
Sexual transgressions were good gossip and most informants  can recall a few 
stories, but  it is easy to see that, given even moderately loose morals, the system 
would not work. This note of puritanical ethic contradicts what has so often 
been written about Eskimos. Other  reports, usually from  Greenland or  Canada, 
stress such seemingly carefree practices as mass wife trading  during  the  “putting 
out the lamp” game or offering “guest privileges’’ to explorers (Birket-Smith 
1959, p. 140; Jenness 1959, p. 52-53). While these descriptions may be correct 
for the eastern Arctic, the sex life of the North Alaskan Eskimo was tightly 
circumscribed. 
married several years later when their husbands had become good hunters. 
Women had plenty of time to become pregnant before marriage; yet only two 
such cases are remembered. In the first case the woman lost  all interest in life, 
allowed herself to become louse infested and  did  not eat. She died before giving 
birth,  as  the community supposed she intended. In the second instance the girl 
kept her pregnancy a secret (which was not difficult considering the heavy 
clothing worn), gave birth alone and buried the baby. The little corpse was 
discovered but  the  mother refused to name the  father until years later. 
Girls usually became “engaged” shortly after their first menstruation but ~ 
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Rarity of birth out of  wedlock  is not  a sure sign  of sexual constraint. If a man 
got  a woman pregnant, he was required to marry her. One informant suggested 
that this was the most common cause of polygyny but could give no examples. 
At any rate, sexual activity outside of marriage was taken seriously, and this 
concern was verbalized in terms of  wife trading. 
Now  for  the  third  point, concerning the uniqueness of Eskimo wife trading. 
The usual question is how can such an unnatural practice exist in Eskimo society? 
In retrospect it seems at least as meaningful to ask why the institution is not 
more widespread. Typically around  the world contracts  are validated by sharing 
such tension reducing practices as eating, drinking alcoholic beverages or 
dancing. This strategy is so effective that when two groups cannot reach a 
mutually agreeable accommodation there is also a taboo against sharing tension 
reducing activities. In both  the United States and Asia, for instance, there is a 
deeply  sensed  feeling that eating in  the same room with someone of a different 
caste is a  threat to the system.  Why  is it  that with so many cultures in the world 
the idea of validating a  contract  through sexual release has so seldom been hit 
upon? 
One answer is that wife trading is not so rare as had formerly been thought. 
The practice was found in much of western North America (Smith 1936, p. 567; 
Wallace and Hoebel 1952, pp. 138-139), Southern Asia (Berreman 1962, pp. 
60-75), Australia (Durkheim 1915, p. 247), and Oceania (Linton 1937, pp. 137- 
196), to name a few cases where wife trading is expected rather than merely 
permitted. Almost always, however, wife trading is fraternal (or sororal) and 
functions to reinforce the levirate (or  sororate);  thus  it is radically different in 
both  form  and  function  from  the Eskimo version (Murdock 1949, p. 268). Rare 
exceptions to the rule do  not seem to contradict  the uniqueness of Eskimo wife 
trading. The Arunta of Australia abandon many taboos, including the taboo 
on wife trading,  during an  annual religious ceremony (Durkheim 1915,  p.  247). 
Chiefs in the  Marquesa Islands built harems and used the resulting scarcity of 
the sexual commodity to attract followers (Linton 1937, pp. 137-196). Nayar 
husbands of southern  India left after three days of marriage to allow their wives 
to become pregnant by anyone of the  appropriate caste (Gough 1959, pp. 23-24). 
In these instances only a few of the potentialities of wife trading have been 
developed. 
One problem which quickly comes to mind is the  threat to the system through 
arousal of jealousy. Eskimo informants remember several such cases and ex- 
plicitly recognize the danger. About seven  miles south of Barrow, near the coast, 
two large rocks stick up through marshy ground. Whenever hunters pass this 
spot they tell the story that those rocks had once been wife trading partners. 
One of the women, they say, became jealous, wanting both men for herself alone. 
She played on the vanity and  latent resentment of the two men until they had  a 
duel. One man was wounded but managed to kill the  other before crawling off 
a little way to die. The two bodies became transformed into stones. “That’s 
how families split up,” the story ends; “when people become greedy, that’s how 
families split up.” 
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Although  the threat of jealousy was real, Murdock (1949, p. 264) claims no 
more  than five percent of the cultures of the  earth contain a general prohibition 
of sex relations outside of marriage. The  fact  that Eskimos fall into  the 95% 
category suggests that jealousy is neither a necessary nor sufficient cause for  the 
widespread rule against wife trading. 
Another limitation is that  the Eskimo version of  wife trading requires both  the 
levirate and  the  sororate  taboo.  In  most societies, the larger problem is not  to 
extend social ties but to preserve those already in existence. Consequently the 
levirate and sororate are often more valuable than prohibitions against them. 
In  North America, for example, only the Eskimos and the Zuni have levirate 
and sororate taboos, and the Zuni could not possibly tolerate the danger of 
violence arising from wife trading (Benedict 1934, pp. 74-75). 
Still another structural limitation in Eskimo wife trading is that since the 
exchange  is symmetrical, the kinship system must be bilateral. A chief in  a society 
based on patrilineal sibs might collect a harem of women from other sibs in 
order to establish defensive  alliances. It would be superfluous at best however to 
“borrow”  a wife.  Even  if the  woman were returned to her own people after the 
first night, as in some Moslem royal families, nothing is lost by honouring her as 
a temporary wife. The chief cannot enter into  an arrangement where the obliga- 
tions of resulting offspring are either shared with two unilineal sibs or are in 
doubt.  This  fact of life by itself limits Eskimo type of  wife  exchange to a  minority 
of known societies. 
One final and rather obvious note: the balance between sexual outlet and 
restraint reached  in different  societies often cannot be combined.  Much  has been 
written about  the advantages to the individual and  to society  of premarital sex 
play. Prohibition of such  experimentation  would involve an administrative effort 
at least. This is a cost many societies do not need to pay because problems 
Eskimos settled through wife  exchange they handle  in other ways. 
In summary,  Alaskan wife trading was a stylized formal validation of contract, 
surrounded by obligations and  taboos  and  not lightly entered into.  The institution 
had  a  number of personal and social functions, most of which  involved broaden- 
ing of social alliances and reinforcing of sexual norms. These advantages  could 
be gained  in this way  only in  a society  with a bilateral kinship system, a levirate- 
sororate taboo and a prohibition on premarital sex play. These conditions, 
which  may  be thought of as constituting necessary but  not sufficient conditions 
for  the practice, are met in so few  societies that  the uniqueness of Eskimo wife 
trading  in those instances where it is possible may  well  be a  matter of historical 
chance. 
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